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ABSTRACT
Machine learning is currently involved in some of the most vigorous debates it has
ever seen. Such debates often seem to go around in circles, reaching no conclusion
or resolution. This is perhaps unsurprising given that researchers in machine learn-
ing come to these discussions with very different frames of reference, making it
challenging for them to align perspectives and find common ground. As a remedy
for this dilemma, we advocate for the adoption of a common conceptual frame-
work which can be used to understand, analyze, and discuss research. We present
one such framework which is popular in cognitive science and neuroscience and
which we believe has great utility in machine learning as well: Marr’s levels of
analysis. Through a series of case studies, we demonstrate how the levels facilitate
an understanding and dissection of several methods from machine learning. By
adopting the levels of analysis in one’s own work, we argue that researchers can
be better equipped to engage in the debates necessary to drive forward progress in
our field.
1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS
The last few months and years have seen researchers embroiled in heated debates touching on funda-
mental questions in machine learning: what, exactly, is “deep learning”? Can it ever be considered
“symbolic”? Is it sufficient to achieve artificial general intelligence? Can it be trusted in high-stakes,
real-world applications? These are important questions, yet the discussions surrounding them seem
unable to move forward productively. This is due, in part, to the lack of a common framework within
which argument and evidence are grounded and compared. Early researchers in computer science,
engineering and cognitive science struggled in this same way, and were led to develop several con-
ceptual frameworks: mental models that align researchers’ understanding of how their work and
philosophies fit into the larger goals of their field and science more broadly (e.g. Chomsky, 1965;
Marr & Poggio, 1976; Newell & Simon, 1976; Marr, 1982; Newell, 1981; Arbib, 1987; Anderson,
1990). Our proposition is to reinvigorate this former tradition of debate by making the use of con-
ceptual frameworks a core part of machine learning research.
We focus in this paper on the use of Marr’s levels of analysis, a conceptual framework popular in
cognitive science and neuroscience. Marr (1982) identified a three-layer hierarchy for describing
and analyzing a computational system:
Computational level. What is the goal of a system, what are its inputs and outputs, and what
mathematical language can be used to express that goal? As an example, let us consider the
case of natural language. In one view, Chomsky (1965) famously argued that the purpose of
language is to structure thought by expressing knowledge in a compositional and recursive way.
Algorithmic or representational level. What representations and algorithms are used to achieve
the computational-level goal? Under Chomsky’s view of language, we might hypothesize that
a language processing system uses symbolic representations like syntax trees and that those
representations are formed using some form of linguistic parsing.
Implementation level. How is the system implemented, either physically or in software? For exam-
ple, we might ask how a neural circuit in the brain could represent syntax trees using population-
based codes, or how a parser should be implemented efficiently in code.
Each level of analysis allows us to identify various hypotheses and constraints about how the sys-
tem operates, and to highlight areas of disagreement. For example, others have argued that the
computational-level goal of language is not to structure thought, but to communicate with others
(Tomasello, 2010). At the algorithmic level, we might argue that syntax trees are an impoverished
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representation for language, and that we must also consider dependency structures, information
compression schemes, context, pragmatics, and so on. And, at the implementation level, we might
consider how things like working memory or attention constrain what algorithms can be realistically
supported.
2 CASE STUDIES IN USING LEVELS OF ANALYSIS
We use four case studies to show how Marr’s levels of analysis can be applied to understanding
methods in machine learning, choosing examples that span the breadth of research in the field. While
the levels have traditionally been used to reverse-engineer biological behavior, here we use them as
a conceptual device that facilitates the structuring and comparison of machine learning methods.
Additionally, we note that our classification of various methods at different levels of analysis may
not be the only possibility, and readers may find themselves disagreeing with us. This disagreement
is a desired outcome: the act of applying the levels forces differing assumptions out into the open so
they can be more readily discussed.
2.1 DEEP Q-NETWORKS (DQN)
DQN (Mnih et al., 2015) is a deep reinforcement learning algorithm originally used to train agents
to play Atari games. At the computational level, the goal of DQN is to efficiently produce ac-
tions which maximize scalar rewards given observations from the environment. We can use the
language of reinforcement learning—and in particular, the Bellman equation—to express this goal
(Sutton & Barto, 2018). At the algorithmic level, DQN performs off-policy one-step temporal dif-
ference (TD) learning (i.e., Q-learning), which can be contrasted with other choices such as SARSA,
n-step Q-learning, TD(λ), and so on. All of these different algorithmic choices are different realiza-
tions of the same goal: to solve the Bellman equation. At the implementation level, we consider
how Q-learning should actually be implemented in software. For example, we can consider the
neural network architecture, optimizer, and hyperparameters, as well as components such as a target
network and replay buffer. We could also consider how to implement Q-learning in a distributed
manner (Horgan et al., 2018).
The levels of analysis when applied to machine learning systems help us to more readily identify
assumptions that are being made and to critique those assumptions. For example, perhaps we wish
to critique DQN for failing to really know what objects are, such as what a “paddle” or “ball” is in
Breakout (Marcus, 2018). While on the surface this comes across as a critique of deep reinforcement
learning more generally, by examining the levels of analysis, it becomes clear that this critique could
actually be made in very different ways at two levels of analysis:
1. At the computational level, the goal of DQN is not to learn about objects but to maximize
scalar reward in a game. Yet, if we care about the system understanding objects, then perhaps
the goal should be formulated such that discovering objects is part of the objective itself (e.g.
Burgess et al., 2019; Greff et al., 2019). Importantly, the fact that the agent uses deep learning is
orthogonal to the question of what the goal is.
2. At the implementation level, we might interpret the critique as being about the method used to
implement the Q-function. Here, it becomes relevant to talk about deep learning. DQN uses a
convolutional neural network to convert visual observations into distributed representations, but
we could argue that these are not the most appropriate for capturing the discrete and composi-
tional nature of objects (e.g. Battaglia et al., 2018; van Steenkiste et al., 2019).
Depending on whether the critique is interpreted at the computational level or implementation level,
one might receive very different responses, thus leading to a breakdown of communication. How-
ever, if the levels were to be used and explicitly referred to when making an argument, there would
be far less room for confusion or misinterpretation and far more room for productive discourse.
2.2 CONVOLUTIONAL NEURAL NETWORKS
One of the benefits of the levels of analysis is that they can be flexibly applied to any computational
system, even when that particular system might itself be a component of a larger system. For ex-
ample, an important component of the DQN agent at the implementation level is a visual frontend
which processes observations and maps them to Q-values (Mnih et al., 2015). Just as we can analyze
the whole DQN agent using the levels of analysis, we can do the same for DQN’s visual system.
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At the computational level, the goal of a vision module is to map spatial data (as opposed to, say,
sequential data or graph-structured data) to a compact representation of objects and scenes that is
invariant to certain types of transformations (such as translation). At the algorithmic level, feed-
forward convolutional networks (Fukushima, 1988; LeCun et al., 1989) are one type of procedure
that processes spatial data while maintaining translational invariance. Within the class of CNNs,
there are many different versions, such as AlexNet (Krizhevsky et al., 2012), ResNet (He et al.,
2016), or dilated convolutions (Yu & Koltun, 2015). However, this need not be the only choice. For
example, we could consider a relational (Wang et al., 2018) or autoregressive (Oord et al., 2016)
architecture instead. Finally, at the implementation level, we can ask how to efficiently implement
the convolution operation in hardware. We could choose to implement our CNN on a CPU, a single
GPU, or multiple GPUs. We may also be concerned with questions about what to do if the parame-
ters or gradients of our network are too large to fit into GPU memory, how to scale to much larger
batch sizes, and how to reduce latency.
Analyzing the CNN on its own highlights how the levels can be applied flexibly to many types of
methods: we can “zoom” our analysis in and out to focus understanding and discussion of different
aspects of larger systems as needed. This ability is particularly useful for analyzing whether a
component of a larger system is really the right one by comparing the role of a component in a
larger system to its computational-level goal in isolation. For example, as we concluded above,
the computational-level goal of a CNN is to process spatial data while maintaining translational
invariance. This might be appropriate for certain types of goals (e.g., object classification) but not
for others in which translational invariance is inappropriate (e.g., object localization).
2.3 SYMBOLIC REASONING ON GRAPHS
A major topic of debate has been the relationship between symbolic reasoning systems and dis-
tributed (deep) learning systems. The levels of analysis provide an ideal way to better illuminate
the form of this relationship. As an illustrative example, let us consider the problem of solving an
NP-complete problem like the Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP), a task that has traditionally been
approached symbolically. At the computational level, given a complete weighted graph (i.e. fully-
connected edges with weights), the goal is to find the minimum-weight path through the graph that
visits each node exactly once. Although finding an exact solution to the TSP takes (in the worst case)
exponential time, we could formulate part of the goal as finding an efficient solution which returns
near-optimal or approximate solutions. At the algorithmic level, there are many ways we could try
to both represent and solve the TSP. As it is an NP-complete problem, we could choose to trans-
form it into other types of NP-complete problems (such as graph coloring, the knapsack problem,
or boolean satisfiablity). A variety of algorithms exist for solving these different types of problems,
with a common approach being heuristic search. While heuristics are typically handcrafted at the
implementation level using a symbolic programming language, they could also be implemented
using deep learning components (e.g. Vinyals et al., 2015; Dai et al., 2017).
Performing this analysis shows howmachine learning systems may simultaneously implement com-
putations with both symbolic and distributed representations at different levels of analysis. Perhaps,
then, discussions about “symbolic reasoning” versus “deep learning” or (“hybrid systems” versus
“non-hybrid systems”) are not the right focus because both symbolic reasoning and deep learning
already coexist in many architectures. Instead, we can use the levels to productively steer discus-
sions to where they can have more of an impact. For example, we could ask: is the logic of the
algorithmic level the right one to achieve the computational-level goal? Is that goal the one we care
about solving in the first place? And, is the architecture used at the implementation level appropriate
for learning or implementing the desired algorithm?
2.4 MACHINE LEARNING IN HEALTHCARE
The last few case studies have focused on applyingMarr’s levels to widely-known algorithms. How-
ever, an important component of any machine learning system is also the data on which it is trained
and its domain of application. We turn to an application of machine learning in real-world settings
where data plays a significant role. Consider a clinical support tool for managing electronic health
records (EHR) (e.g. Wu et al., 2010; Tomasˇev et al., 2019). At the computational level, the goal of
this system is to improve patient outcomes by predicting patient deterioration during the course of
hospitalization. Performing this computational-level analysis encourages us to think deeply about all
facets of the overall goal, such as: what counts as a meaningful prediction that gives sufficient time
to act? Are there clinically-motivated labels available? How should the system deal with imbalances
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in clinical treatments and patient populations? What unintended or undesirable consequences might
arise from deployment of such a system? The algorithmic level asks what procedures should be
used for collecting and representing the data in order to achieve the computational-level goal. For
example, how are data values encoded (e.g., censoring extreme values, one-hot encodings, using
derived summary-statistics)? Is the time of an event represented using regular intervals or not? And,
what methods allow us to develop longitudinal models of such high-dimensional and highly-sparse
data? This is where familiar models of gradient-boosted trees or logistic regression enter. Finally,
at the implementation level, questions arise regarding how the system is deployed. For example,
we may need to consider data sandboxing and security, inter-operability, the role of open-standards,
data encryption, and interactions and behavioural changes when the system is deployed.
In addition to facilitating debate, applying Marr’s levels of analysis in a domain like healthcare em-
phasizes important aspects of design decisions that need to be made. For example, the representation
we choose at the algorithmic level can lock in choices at the beginning of a research program that
has important implications for lower levels of analysis. Choosing to align the times when data is
collected into six hour buckets will affect underlying structure and predictions, with implications on
how performance is analyzed and for later deployment. Similarly, “alerting fatigue” is a common
concern of such methods, and can be debated at the computational level by asking questions related
to the broader interactions of the system with existing clinical pathways, or at the implementation
level through mechanisms for alert-filtering. When we consider questions of bias in the data sets
used, especially in healthcare, the levels can help us identify whether such bias is a result of clinical
constraints at the computational level, or whether it is an artefact of algorithmic-level choices.
3 BEYOND MARR
As our case studies have demonstrated, Marr’s levels of analysis are a powerful conceptual frame-
work that can be used to define, understand, and discuss research in machine learning. The reason
that the levels work so well is that they allow researchers to approach discussion using a common
frame-of-reference that highlights different choices or assumptions, streamlining discussion while
also encouraging skepticism. We suggest readers try this exercise themselves: apply the levels to a
recent paper that you enjoyed (or disliked!) as well as your own research. We have found this ap-
proach to be a useful way to understand our own specific papers as well as the wider research within
which they sit. While the process is sometimes harder than expected, the difficulties that arise are
are often exactly in the places we have overlooked and where deeper investigation is needed.
Machine learning research often implicitly relies on several similar conceptual frameworks, although
they are not often formalized in the way Marr’s levels are. For example, most deep learning re-
searchers will recognize an architecture-loss paradigm: a given problem is studied in terms of a
computational graph that processes and transforms data into some output, and a method that com-
putes prediction errors and propagates them to drive parameter and distribution updates. Similarly,
many software engineers will recognize the algorithm-software-hardware distinction: a problem can
be understood in terms of the algorithm to be computed, the software which computes that algorithm,
and the hardware on which the software runs. While both of these frameworks are conceptually use-
ful, neither fully captures the full set of abstractions ranging from the computational-level goal to
the physical implementation.
Of course, Marr’s levels are not without limitations or alternatives. Even in the course of writing this
paper, we considered whether it would make sense to split the algorithmic level into two, mirroring
the original four-level formulation put forth by Marr & Poggio (1976). Researchers from cogni-
tive science and neuroscience have also spent considerable effort discussing alternate formulations
of the levels (e.g. Sun, 2008; Griffiths et al., 2012; Poggio, 2012; Danks, 2013; Peebles & Cooper,
2015; Niv & Langdon, 2016; Yamins & DiCarlo, 2016; Krafft & Griffiths, 2018; Love, 2019). For
example, Poggio (2012) argues that learning should be added as an additional level within Marr’s
hierarchy. Additionally,Marr’s levels do not explicitly recognize the socially-situated role of compu-
tational systems, leading to proposals for alternate hierarchies that consider the interactions between
computational systems themselves, as well as the socio-cultural processes in which those systems
are embedded (Nissenbaum, 2001; Sun, 2008). The ideal conceptual framework for machine learn-
ing will need to go beyond Marr to also address such considerations. In the meantime, we believe
that Marr’s levels are useful as a common conceptual lens for machine learning researchers to start
with. Given such a lens, we believe that researchers will be better equipped to discuss and view their
research, and to ultimately address the many deep questions of our field.
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